https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20021024 Concerning the appellant’s request that the November 21, 2021 order of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands revoking the appellant’s pretrial release conditions and remanding him into the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections be reversed, and his further requests that this Court order his immediate release from custody and direct the Superior Court to consider and rule on his April 27, 2022 third motion to modify release conditions, the Superior Court failed to adequately consider less severe penalties that would have met the purposes of Rule 5-1 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding conditions of release. Courts in the Virgin Islands must adhere to Rule 5-1 by carefully crafting specific bail conditions according to the facts of each case that constitute the least restrictive means of ensuring community safety, a defendant’s court appearances, and the integrity of the judicial process. As a result, the Superior Court abused its discretion when it revoked appellant’s pretrial release conditions, remanded him to the Bureau of Corrections indefinitely while awaiting trial, and denied his third motion seeking modification of bail conditions. The Superior Court’s November 21, 2021 order is vacated and the matter is remanded to that court with instructions to have the appellant released from custody upon a revised set of pretrial release conditions. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20311665 12810860_20311665 Tue, 04 Jun 2024 15:59:00 GMT Considering an appeal brought by a union, as the bargaining representative for certain employees within the Government of the Virgin Islands’ Division of Personnel (“DOP”), from a memorandum opinion and order of the Superior Court affirming a decision of the Public Employees Relations Board (the “PERB”) excluding two employees (one, a Recruitment and Classification Supervisor, and the other, a Territorial Administrator) from a collective bargaining unit due to their status as “confidential employees,” the Superior Court erred by relying on federal case law and the labor-nexus test rather than 24 V.I.C. §362(q) in determining which employees are “confidential.” However, this error was harmless, as the PERB correctly excluded the employees in question from the bargaining unit because they were political appointees within the intendment of 24 V.I.C. § 362(g)(2) who possessed confidential relationships with policy-making officials. Since the Superior Court did not err in finding that substantial evidence supported the PERB’s decision, the Superior Court’s order enforcing the underlying order of the PERB in this respect is affirmed. Regarding the DOP’s cross-appeal, the Superior Court erred when it sua sponte found that two other employees (one, a Personnel Records Management Supervisor, and the other, a Financial Management Supervisor) are non-supervisory employees. Supervisory classification is neither relevant to the issues in this case, nor was it raised before the Superior Court or by the parties, and this appeal does not present the rare, exceptional case warranting consideration of an issue not previously raised by the parties. Accordingly, the portion of the Superior Court’s opinion and order finding that these two other employees are non-supervisory employees is vacated. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20084165 12810860_20084165 Fri, 09 Feb 2024 12:20:00 GMT In a personal injury action, the Superior Court’s September 1, 2021 order entering summary judgment in favor of two defendants solely on the ground that they were not “land possessors” is reversed. Under more than a decade of case law this Court has held that foreseeability is the touchstone for the existence of the duty of reasonable or ordinary care in premises liability actions, and the distinction between invitees, licensees, and trespassers has been abolished in premises liability cases because it is in conflict with this Court's jurisprudence and modern negligence law generally. The soundest common law rule for the Virgin Islands applies the holding that foreseeability of harm is the touchstone of the existence of a land possessor's duty of reasonable or ordinary care—in all premises liability actions. This reasoning compels a rejection of the formalistic distinction between owners who are “land possessors” or “occupiers” and those who are not.  Rather, in all premises liability actions the touchstone is the foreseeability of harm, and not the labels attached to the plaintiff or the defendant. Here, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establishes genuine issues of material fact with respect to the elements of her premises liability claim. The defendants’ contention that the sublease agreement precluded them from entering the property or ordering repairs or changes to the vehicle ramp is rejected; its plain text establishes the contrary and the plain language of the sublease agreement expressly granted defendants a virtually unrestricted right to enter the premises to inspect its condition and order any repairs that their lessee failed to make.  Moreover, there is substantial evidence which creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants knew or should have known about the dangerous conditions that caused plaintiff’s injury.  The testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and considered in conjunction with the terms of the sublease agreement, certainly creates various issues of material fact as to whether defendants (1) were largely absentee landlords who inspected the property very infrequently despite having reserved in the sublease agreement the right to inspect the property at any reasonable hour; (2) knew that their lessee had failed to maintain the property, with the condition of the property deteriorating “year after year after year”;  (3) were aware that at least on some occasions a vehicle ramp not intended for use by pedestrians had been used by pedestrians; and (4) despite having the unrestricted right under the sublease agreement to make repairs to and abate nuisances on the property without the lessee’s consent, elected to not do so, and chose to only ask him to clean the property after each visit, even though these requests were always unsuccessful.  Thus, there are triable issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary judgment.  The Superior Court erred when it held, at the summary judgment stage, that defendants did not owe a legal duty to plaintiff, and there are material issues of fact as to whether these defendants possessed a legal right to enter the property and make necessary repairs, and knew or should have known of the dangerous condition that caused plaintiff’s injury, yet failed to take any reasonable action to prevent it.  Accordingly, the September 1, 2021 order entering summary judgment in favor of these defendants is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20036708 12810860_20036708 Tue, 23 Jan 2024 12:35:00 GMT In an action seeking title by adverse possession to a property on St. Croix, the Superior Court’s November 27, 2019 order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant/appellee is affirmed, because the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the hostility requirement of their adverse possession claim. Pursuant 28 V.I.C. § 11, adverse possession is established by the uninterrupted, exclusive, actual, physical adverse, continuous, notorious possession of real property under claim or color of title for 15 years or more, and the party asserting adverse possession bears the burden of proving all the required elements by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the plaintiffs commenced possession of the property as permissive tenants. It is immaterial that there was never a formal written lease agreement executed between the parties because in the Virgin Islands a periodic tenancy may be created orally. There is no fixed rule or mechanical formula to determine whether possession is hostile and, generally, entry by virtue of a lease or the payment of rent bars adverse possession claims as either or both actions implicitly recognize a superior claim of another to the property. Caselaw has held that constructive notice that property is under a claim of ownership can transform a permissive tenancy to a hostile claim, and the true question following a permissive entry is whether the claimant gave the record title holder proper notice of their adverse or hostile intent. Here the plaintiffs did not present proof of unambiguous hallmarks of ownership of the property, and the evidence was not enough to establish constructive notice of the their adverse or hostile intent. Importantly, in this case the plaintiffs have consistently recognized the defendant’s superior claim of ownership to the property. The circumstances surrounding the property show that defendant was not alerted to the plaintiffs’ intention to assert ownership at any point. As a result, their adverse possession claim cannot be sustained, as they fail to meet the crucial requirement of "hostility" for establishing adverse possession. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated genuine issues of fact that warrant the reversal of the summary judgment entered by the Superior Court below. As a result, the summary judgment entered below in favor of the defendant is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20036277 12810860_20036277 Mon, 22 Jan 2024 20:20:00 GMT In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that suspected critical evidence was wrongly withheld from the defendant, causing him to enter a plea of nolo contendere that was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred, and the Superior Court’s order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but for different reasons than those relied on below. The habeas petition now before this Court is petitioner’s second attack on the voluntary and intelligent character of his plea. In the direct appeal in 2018, he argued that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent as he had relied upon the recommended sentence under the plea agreement of 10 years, stating that he would not have acquiesced had he known that the trial judge was going to sentence him to 20 years, despite having been informed that a 20-year sentence was a possible outcome. His arguments have changed, yet the issue they support remains the same, and issues already considered and rejected by this Court on the merits on direct appeal may not be relitigated through a habeas petition. The fact that petitioner failed to exhaust his potential arguments in the prior appeal does not give him the right to relitigate the same issue with novel arguments in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon review, therefore, the trial court’s order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is upheld, because superior court should have denied the petition because the claims were uniformly procedurally barred. For these reasons, the Superior Court’s October 15, 2021 order is affirmed and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20034192 12810860_20034192 Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:38:00 GMT Because 14 V.I.C. of title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code is a codification of the common law presumption of sanity, there was no error in the trial below on charges including attempted murder, assault and firearms violations, when the trial court held that the mere filing of a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense, in compliance with the rules of criminal procedure, does not rebut the presumption of sanity. Additionally, because the evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, in light of common sense and everyday experience, logically and rationally allowed for the conclusion that the defendant’s actions were not a result of mental illness, there was no error when a motion for judgment of acquittal was denied at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Further, a prosecution witness was qualified to offer expert testimony in this matter and validly undermined the opinions of a defense expert, a valid method of discrediting the defense’s evidence of insanity and creating an issue of fact for the jury to decide. The admission of the testimony from the prosecution witness was not an abuse of discretion. While the prosecution made inappropriate statements during the trial, the evidence in this matter was corroborated by multiple witnesses and exhibits and was simply overwhelming. It is concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the challenged statements, though improper, did not affect the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the denial of the defense motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, a jury instruction regarding introduction of some evidence of mental illness by the defense accurately stated the law in the Virgin Islands and the trial court’s refusal to give other instructions requested by the defendant was not error, much less an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the October 6, 2017 judgment and commitment of the Superior Court is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20034030 12810860_20034030 Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:34:00 GMT In an appeal by a minor from a final order of the Family Division of the Superior Court ending his probation, closing his case, and transferring him to the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) for continued supervision, the order of the Superior Court is reversed. Generally an appellee's failure to raise an issue in the trial court does not preclude him or her from asserting that issue on appeal as a ground for affirming the trial court, and here the People as Appellees merely responded to the minor’s arguments. On the merits, the Superior Court improperly placed the minor under unauthorized administrative probation without statutory authority. Under § 2525, a child on probation incident to being adjudicated delinquent, who violates a term of probation, may be proceeded against in a probation revocation hearing, and the Superior Court may extend the period of probation or make any other authorized order of disposition. However, none of the procedures specified in § 2525 were followed in this case. The DOJ did not file a revocation complaint here, the Superior Court did not hold a hearing, and the minor did not receive his accompanying due process rights. There is no statute or case precedent which permits the Superior Court to take the actions that it did in this case. Therefore, the Superior Court erred, and its order transferring the minor to DHS must be reversed. On remand, the Superior Court must either terminate the minor’s probation under § 2524, or follow the procedures set forth in § 2525 to extend, modify, revoke, or otherwise dispose of the minor’s probation, should the DOJ file a motion to revoke probation under that section. The order of the Superior Court is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20023196 12810860_20023196 Thu, 11 Jan 2024 18:06:00 GMT In an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. The Superior Court was not obligated to automatically issue a writ of habeas corpus simply because a petitioner files a habeas petition claiming to assert truthful facts. Rather, the court must test the sufficiency of facts in the petition and compare them with applicable law to ascertain whether the petition establishes a prima facie showing. Here, the court correctly appraised the allegations in the petition and determined them to be either deficient or unsubstantiated according to the trial record. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s performance prejudiced him resulting in an unreliable and fundamentally unfair outcome in the proceeding. Evidence adduced at trial is assessed under a totality of the circumstances and here, along with the challenged admissions, the People presented to the jury ample evidence that warranted finding petitioner guilty of numerous crimes, including first degree murder beyond a reasonable. The petitioner also fails to identify how trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the now-challenged statements precluded his ability to obtain a new trial. Failure to object to the admission of the alleged prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses did not prejudice the petitioner in a manner warranting habeas corpus relief, and indeed did not constitute deficient performance. To prevail on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must identify evidence that is so conclusive and so persuasive that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, Hughes’ affidavit is not new evidence. Thus the Superior Court’s denial of this petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20021111 12810860_20021111 Thu, 11 Jan 2024 13:02:00 GMT