Case Caption: Hodge v. Allenbaugh Case Number: SCT-CIV-2023-0012Date: 09/12/2025Author: Swan, Ive Arlington Citation: 2025 VI 21Summary: In proceedings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 16 V.I.C. § 115 et seq., concerning an appeal from the Superior Court’s order granting in part the appellee’s motion to approve, as authorized under the cost and fee recovery provisions of the Act, a request for reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs incurred from 2014 to 2019 pertaining to the Superior Court and appellate proceedings that was filed 126 days after the final judgment, the motion was untimely by operation of V.I. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(A). While an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party is authorized under the Act and is within the Superior Court’s discretion to approve, when the motion seeking same is filed beyond the 30-day deadline imposed by Rule 54(d)(1)(A), and the movant did not seek an extension or request leave to file the motion late, the movant has the burden of demonstrating good cause or excusable neglect for filing the motion untimely. In considering whether the movant has met its burden, the factors specifically enumerated in V.I. R. Civ. P. 6 must be considered, along with all relevant circumstances. Here, a review of the record reveals that the appellee failed to provide any reason for filing her motion late, that the Superior Court did not take the Rule 6 factors into consideration, and that the Superior Court, while emphasizing that the appellee was a pro se litigant, suggested that because the appellant failed to timely respond to the appellee’s motion he was not prejudiced by the fact it was untimely. Appellee’s failure to provide an explanation for her untimely filing is fatal because clear or plain neglect is distinguishable from and not equivalent to excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 6(b)(1)(B). Nor does her pro se status excuse her noncompliance with the aforementioned procedural rules. Litigants representing themselves in the courts of the U.S. Virgin Islands must be held to the same standard as practicing attorneys when a court must determine if compliance with a rule-imposed deadline is achieved, as it would be unfair to hold a represented party to a strict standard while granting leniency to a party who chooses to forgo legal representation. Because appellee failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect, the Superior Court abused its discretion when it accepted her untimely motion requesting attorney’s fees and costs. The Superior Court’s order is vacated and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.Attachment: Open Document or Opinion