Case Caption: In Re: Garcia Case Number: SCT-CIV-2021-0178Date: 03/11/2025Author: Swan, Ive Arlington Citation: 2025 VI 8Summary: In the appellant’s challenge to the dismissal with prejudice of her interlocutory appeal by the Superior Court Appellate Division from an order of the Superior Court Magistrate Division disqualifying Attorney Mark L. Milligan from representing her in a probate case, the dismissal is reversed and this case is remanded with instructions to direct the Magistrate Division to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Milligan’s disqualification. One exception to the final judgment rule, not codified in 4 V.I.C. § 33(b)-(c), is the collateral order doctrine, a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule that applies to a small class of prejudgment orders which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, and are too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. A proponent must demonstrate that the challenged ruling (1) conclusively determined the disputed question; (2) resolved an important issue separate from the merits of the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Here, the order appealed to the Appellate Division was not final and, although Sergent only implicitly alleged the collateral order doctrine as a basis by which the Appellate Division could address her appeal, her assertion is persuasive and this Court will remand this matter to the Superior Court with instructions as outlined in this opinion. There are several reasons for treating certain orders as final in the probate context even when equivalent orders entered in ordinary civil cases would not qualify as final orders. Here, an internal appeal case is authorized by Superior Court Rule 322(a), and rather than dismiss the appeal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, the Superior Court should have recognized that an exception to the final judgment rule existed which allowed it to hear the matter and decide the appeal on the merits. In the proceedings below, to decide Milligan’s disqualification pursuant to Rule 211.3.7 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Professional Conduct, the Magistrate Division merely reviewed billing submissions and deduced that they indicated Milligan had personal information germane to the litigation: the Magistrate Division failed to question Milligan concerning the accuracy of the submissions, failed to ask Sergent about Garcia’s awareness and understanding of the will Milligan prepared, and failed to interview the witnesses who allegedly signed the document at Garcia’s behest and who saw Garcia volitionally sign the document. With such sparse information, we cannot conclude that the Magistrate had a sufficient record from which to properly address Milligan’s disqualification. Accordingly, the Magistrate Division erred when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his disqualification. Therefore, this case is remanded with instructions to the Superior Court to direct the Magistrate Division to conduct an evidentiary hearing to properly ascertain if Milligan should be disqualified from representing appellant and the estate of Felipe Garcia.Attachment: Open Document or Opinion