Case Caption: Limetree Bay Terminals, LLC v. Liger Case Number: SCT-Civ-2023-0045Date: 08/02/2024Author: Hodge, Rhys S. Citation: 2024 VI 26Summary: In this appeal, the granting of a motion for a trial preference is reversed after consideration of this question: Whether subsection (b)(4) of 5 V.I.C. § 31, which restricts when the court must set a preference trial for an elderly party and further restricts the number and length of continuances to be granted, is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers principle or guarantees of equal protection? Act No. 8468 amended title 5, § 31(b), creating three statutory preferences. In this case, plaintiff moved for—and the Superior Court granted—the mandatory preference provided for in § 31(b)(1), based solely on him being 70 years of age or older. He did not request, nor did the Superior Court grant, a preference pursuant to §§ 31(b)(2) or 31(b)(3), and only the constitutionality of § 31(b)(1) is at issue here. The Revised Organic Act established a system of separation of powers, with executive functions vested in the Executive Branch, legislative functions vested in the Legislative Branch, and judicial functions vested in the Judicial Branch, and it places structural limits on the authority of the Legislature to make law. The authority of this Court to create procedural rules and substantive law is concurrent with the Legislature but allocation of authority differs depending on whether a matter is procedural or substantive: conflicts between rules promulgated by the judiciary and rules promulgated by the Legislature are resolved in favor of the judiciary if the rules are procedural, and in favor of the Legislature if the statute creates substantive law. The Legislature only infringes on authority of the Judicial Branch when it establishes procedures that irreconcilably conflict with those established by the Judicial Branch or that impermissibly interfere with internal operations of the court system or authority of individual judicial officers to perform their official acts. Plaintiff cites no authority supporting his claim that courts should apply different legal standards to “facial” and “as-applied” separation of powers claims. Here, the mandatory preference statute unquestionably infringes on the inherent judicial power exercised by individual judges: § 31(b)(1) requires that a court “shall grant” the motion if filed by a party who at least 70 years of age, entirely divesting inherent judicial power to exercise discretion over how to manage the case. Section 31(b)(4) then mandates that “the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 180 days from that date that the elderly party moves for preference,” again entirely divesting it of inherent judicial power to schedule the matter. Section 31(b)(4) further prohibits granting any continuance except for physical disability, and permits only granting one such continuance which cannot exceed 30 days. These provisions do not merely guide the Superior Court in how to manage its docket, but instead divest it of discretion entirely and transfer it to any party who is 70 years of age or over who files a motion under the statute. In addition to impermissibly interfering with the inherent judicial power of individual judges, the mandatory preference statute infringes on the authority of the Judicial Branch—and particularly this Court—to exercise its inherent power to manage its own internal affairs. While the Legislature possesses concurrent jurisdiction to develop court procedures, that does not extend to overruling the procedural court rules promulgated by this Court, for conflicts between procedural rules promulgated by the judiciary and procedural rules promulgated by the Legislature are resolved in favor of the judiciary. Several rules promulgated by this Court govern the same subject-matter as the mandatory preference statute. The argument that other options are available to defendants wholly lacks merit, as a litigant need not take futile actions or unnecessarily waste judicial resources to preserve an issue for appellate review. The mandatory preference statute, § 31(b)(1), violates the separation of powers principles of the Revised Organic Act and is therefore unconstitutional and void as a matter of Virgin Islands law. The June 7, 2023, order is reversed.Attachment: Open Document or Opinion