S.Ct. Civ. No. 2009-0023

The Court holds that, although 5 V.I.C. § 1(b) only references the "district court" and the "Superior Court," the Supreme Court possesses the authority to enact Supreme Court Rule 30 pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 541 because, consistent with its prior precedents, the establishment of the Supreme Court implicitly amended section 1(b). Moreover, the Court holds that, notwithstanding the implicit amendment of section 1(b), fee-shifting statutes such as section 541 by their very nature authorize the recovery of appellate attorney's fees because to hold otherwise would undermine the public policy considerations that underlie the fee-shifting statute. Furthermore, the Court holds that the prevailing party on appeal is entitled to an award of appellate attorney's fees even if that party may not ultimately be the prevailing party in subsequent Superior Court proceedings on remand. Finally, the Court finds that, when a remand to the Superior Court has been ordered and a party challenges the reasonableness of a request for appellate attorney's fees, the interests of judicial economy are furthered by allowing the Superior Court to determine the exact amount of appellate attorney's fees that should be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal.